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JACK VOLTAIC 3.0
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Increasingly Connected, Ready to Respond
The Jack Voltaic 3.0 Cyber Research Project is an innovative, bottom-up approach to critical 
infrastructure resilience. It will build our understanding of existing cybersecurity capabilities 
as well as identify gaps. Jack Voltaic 3.0 will contribute to a repeatable framework cities and 
municipalities nationwide can use to prepare. The research will also provide findings and 
recommendations for the military, federal agencies, and policy makers.
Cyber Research Report
Prepare | Prevent | Respond
The Jack Voltaic (JV) Cyber Research Project is an innovative, bottom-up approach to 
critical infrastructure resilience that informs our understanding of existing cybersecurity 
capabilities and identifies gaps. JV 3.0 contributed to a repeatable framework cities and 
municipalities Nationwide can use to prepare. This report on JV 3.0 provides findings and 
recommendations for the military, federal agencies, and policy makers.
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INTRODUCTION
The Army Cyber Institute’s (ACI’s) Jack Voltaic (JV) project enables the institute to study incident 
response gaps alongside assembled partners to identify interdependencies among critical infrastructure 
and provide recommendations. JV provides an innovative, bottom-up approach to critical infrastructure 
resilience in two unique ways. Whereas most federal efforts to improve resiliency focus on regional or 
multistate emergency response, JV focuses on cities and municipalities where critical infrastructure 
and populations are most heavily populated. Furthermore, JV deviates from other cybersecurity and 
national preparedness exercises in that it builds around areas of interest nominated by the participants. 
Although JV events include national-level capabilities and resources, they are conceptually driven by 
the concerns of the cities and their infrastructure partners. Through this approach, the ACI, the Army, 
and the Department of Defense (DoD) are able to harvest insights about potential roles, dependencies, 
partners, and support requests, while cities are able to discover potential capability gaps and expand 
their critical infrastructure information-sharing networks before a potential disaster strikes.
JV 3.0 leveraged the JV approach to allow the ACI to gain insight into how multiple levels of industry 
and government respond to a cyberattack against commercial critical infrastructure that supports Army 
force projection operations—specifically, critical infrastructure in port cities from which Army personnel 
and equipment would deploy in the case of a military conflict overseas.1  In parallel with the Army’s 
Defender 20202  force projection exercise, JV 3.0 examined and analyzed the ability of Charleston, 
South Carolina (SC), and Savannah, Georgia (GA)—two major ports on the East Coast—to support force 
projection in the face of a cyberattack against their commercial critical infrastructure.
C H A R L E S T O N
S A V A N N A H
Figure 1: JV 3.0 examined and analyzed the ability of Charleston, SC, and Savannah, GA, to 
support force projection in the face of a cyberattack against their critical infrastructure.
1  Mark Pomerleau, “How the Army Is Strengthening Cyber Cities,” Fifth Domain, July 30, 2019, https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/
army/2019/07/30/how-the-army-is-strengthening-cyber-cities/.
2  “DEFENDER-EUROPE 20,” Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (website), n.d., https://shape.nato.int/defender-europe, 
accessed December 29, 2020.
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Originally planned as a 3-day event in April 2020 to be held simultaneously in these two port cities, the 
ACI decided to make JV 3.0 two single-day, virtual events—one for Charleston on September 22, 2020, 
and one for Savannah on September 24, 2020—because of complications arising from the coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Leveraging the Distributed Environment for Critical Infrastructure 
Decision-making Exercise (DECIDE®) platform and Microsoft Teams, the ACI and its partners prepared the participants for the transition to distributed execution through several virtual tabletop exercises 
(TTXs) and rehearsals that included Jack Pandemus, a half-day event that simulated a cyberattack 
during pandemic conditions. Table 1 provides information on the different organizations and sectors 
that participated in and supported JV 3.0.
Sector Charleston Savannah Additional Participants:
GA NG, SC NG, FEMA 
Region IV, 3ID, USAG 
Fort Stewart, DOE, 
ARCYBER, ARNORTH, 
Blank Slate Solution, 
DCO Region IV, FBI, City 
of Hinesville, Chubb 
Insurance, M.C. Dean, 
Nevada Cyber Solutions, 
SoCal Gas, Atlas 
Cybersecurity
Transportation SC Port Authority GA Port Authority
Southeastern Freight Lines (trucking company)
US Coast Guard
841st Transportation BN (597th TRANS BDE, SDDC)




Energy Dominion Energy Georgia Power / Southern 
Co.




City of Charleston EM Chatham County EM White Cell and Research 
Support:













• University of 
Illinois CIRI
• University of South 
Carolina
• U.S. Army War College
City of Charleston FD Chatham County PD / 911
Town of Mount Pleasant 
EM
City of Savannah EM
City of Savannah PD & FD
Communications AT&T Local Solutions
AT&T Public Sector Solutions (FirstNet)
Information 
Technology
City of Charleston IT Chatham County ICS
Town of Mount Pleasant IT City of Savannah IT
DHS CISA Region IV
Government 
Facilities
City of Charleston City of Savannah
Charleston County School 
District




City of Savannah Water
Table 1: JV 3.0 Participants
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ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF JACK VOLTAIC
The ACI is an outward-facing partnership think tank of the U.S. Army located in West Point, New 
York. It began the JV research series to enable the Army’s ability to leverage strategic partnerships, to 
improve information sharing and response at all levels of government, and to develop a repeatable 
and adaptable framework that local governments can use to rehearse their cyber incident response 
capabilities. The idea for JV originated from a workshop conducted by the ACI in April 2016 known as 
the Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop.3 
Jack Voltaic 1.0—New York City: The inaugural event, JV 1.0, which was developed with industry 
partner CITI, examined interdependencies among six critical infrastructure sectors in New York City. 
The ACI examined these interdependencies by assessing the performance of federal, state, and local 
governments, as well as private industry, in the event of a Cyber Worst Day scenario.4 
Jack Voltaic 2.0—Houston: Conducted in August 2018 and developed with industry partner AECOM, 
JV 2.0 assembled partners from the City of Houston, the State of Texas, federal agencies, and eight 
different sectors to collaborate on an integrated cyber range and TTX. The event centered on a 
hypothetical scenario in which a hurricane and cyberspace attack struck simultaneously in and around 
the Houston region. 
Jack Voltaic 2.5—In summer 2019, the ACI held the JV 2.5 Cyber Workshop Series in the port cities of 
San Diego, Tacoma, San Francisco, Savannah, Charleston, Augusta, and Norfolk. The educational series 
sought to engage municipality leaders and critical infrastructure sectors to increase cyber awareness 
and discuss relationships between commercial critical infrastructure and DoD critical missions. AECOM 
and the ACI, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security National Exercise Division, 
conducted these 1-day training workshops to share insights from JV 2.0 and discuss how similar efforts 
have the potential to strengthen the cyber resiliency of DoD missions. 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
JV 3.0 was a city-focused exercise event that demonstrated how multiple small-scale, cascading 
cyberattacks against local municipalities and their commercial critical infrastructure in the strategic 
port cities of Charleston, SC, and Savannah, GA, could disrupt force projection operations. Research 
objectives included the following:
• Examine the impact of a cyber event on Army force projection;
• Exercise the cities of Charleston and Savannah in emergency cyber incident response to ensure the 
provision of public services and safeguard critical infrastructure;
• Reinforce a whole-of-community approach in response to cyber incidents through sustained, multi-
echelon partnerships across industry, academia, and government;
• Examine the coordination process for providing cyber protection capabilities in support of Defense 
Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) requests; and
• Support the development of a repeatable and adaptable framework that allows a city to exercise 
its response to a multisector cyber event.
3  Jonathon Monken et. al, Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop Report (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering 
Institute, 2018).
4  Army Cyber Institute, Jack Voltaic Executive Summary (West Point, NY: Army Cyber Institute, 2016).
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DESIGN CONCEPT
In designing the scenario, the ACI’s strategy was to use injects that progressively built upon one 
another, avoid introducing attribution, and keep incident causes ambiguous for as long as possible. 
This “death by a thousand cuts” approach allowed the ACI and its partners the opportunity to explore 
thresholds at which organizations would identify a cyber incident and request support. Keeping the 
cause of the incident ambiguous facilitated debate among participants, encouraged them to share their 
decision-making processes with other participants, and increased the realism of the exercise.
The scenario was designed to be played over a series of turns and to weave together multiple 
independent threads—a set of sector-specific injects that build on themselves—to form a cohesive 
story. Each thread was built such that its specific injects would grow progressively more dangerous, 
either by spreading to new areas, organizations, or systems or by causing increased amounts of 
damage to affected entities. During the planning workshops leading up to JV 3.0, it was evident that 
many participating organizations, particularly in the municipalities, lacked the resources to adequately 
defend against a sophisticated adversary. Therefore, the JV Planning Team designed the scenario from 
a perspective of assumed compromise. Many of the scenario parameters, such as when malware 
exploitation would migrate from sector to sector, were deliberately kept opaque to the players. This 
approach forced participants to respond to incidents rather than attempt to defend against them. See 
figure 2 for a graphical display of the expected progression.
SCENARIO PHILOSOPHY
• Start small (locality and severity)
• Use injects which build on each other 
and in sequence to each other
• Introduce attribution late
1 Scenario effect causing catastrophic damage 
on a singe entity or organization
2 Catastrophic effects cross to another sector











































































Low: Internally inconvenient or not noticeable, no noticeable external effect
Medium: Internally disruptive, externally inconvenient
High: Internally destructive, externally disruptive
Catastrophic: Serious economic damage and/or some loss of life, serious disruption




Multi: Three or more
Figure 2: JV 3.0 Scenario Development Framework
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PLANNING TIME LINE
The ACI and its partners held a series of planning meetings and workshops that facilitated establishing 
the membership of the Planning Committee, understanding stakeholder objectives for the exercise, 
and developing a scenario that would meet stakeholder and event objectives (see Figure 3, “JV 3.0 
Planning Time Line”). Prior to March 2020, the Planning Committee met in person for most meetings 
and workshops. These on-site events allowed the members of the committee to develop strong 
relationships and trust that eased the transition to virtual events after pandemic-related restrictions 
took hold. 
When the Planning Committee shifted to a virtual execution, they recognized two key challenges: 
maintaining stakeholder engagement and increasing participant comfort with the required technology. 
The ACI, Norwich University Applied Research Institute (NUARI), and FTI Consulting sought to address 
these challenges by providing stakeholders and participants an opportunity to participate in three 
separate virtual TTXs. The first, Jack Pandemus, was a 3-hour event that served as a test for virtual 
execution using both NUARI’s DECIDE® and Microsoft Teams. Following Jack Pandemus, the ACI and its partners held two additional 4-hour events using DECIDE® and Microsoft Teams. These rehearsal events allowed the Planning Committee to refine its execution plan and provided participants 
additional opportunities to gain experience with the event and the various supporting platforms.
Execution 
of JV 3.0 
as a virtual, 
distributed 
event.
Rehearsals for distributed 
execution, focusing on 
participant familiarization 
and data collection.
The ACI, FTI Consulting, 
and NUARI executed Jack 
Pandemus, a distributed 
TTX that focused on 
Charleston and Savannah’s 
responses to a cyberattack 
during a pandemic.
The ACI, FTI Consulting, and NUARI 
held Planner Workshop #3 in 
Charleston, SC, to validate the scenario 
and execution with stakeholders.
COVID-19 resulted in DoD travel restrictions, 
which delayed JV execution from April 2020 to 
September 2020 and prompted the ACI to change 
JV 3.0 from an on-site event to a virtual event. 
JV 3.0 Legal/Policy TTX 
at the Savannah Civic 
Center to clarify roles 
and relationships in 
cyber incident response; 












































JV 2.5 workshop in 
Charleston, conducted by 
the ACI and AECOM and 
hosted by the Citadel.
IPM with city, state, and 
federal representatives 
at the Georgia 
Cyber Center to gain 
concurrence on scope 
and event objectives.
The ACI and FTI Consulting 
conducted site surveys with 
stakeholders in Savannah, GA, to 
refine stakeholder objectives and 
identify additional participants.
The ACI and FTI 
Consulting held 
Planner Workshop 
#1 at the Savannah 
Civic Center.
The ACI and FTI Consulting 
conducted site surveys with 
stakeholders in Savannah, 
GA, to refine stakeholder 
objectives and identify 
additional participants.
The ACI held the Workshop 
Kick-Off Webinar, detailing 
the planning teams and 
workshop schedule.
Virtual workshops 
with the cities of 
Charleston and 
Savannah focused on 
transitioning from 
an on-site event to a 
virtual one.
MPM with city, 
state, and federal 
representatives in 





Figure 3: JV 3.0 Planning Time Line
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EVENT FORMAT
During each single-day event, participants played the scenario over a series of turns, each of which 
included three phases. Phase 1, “Assess,” allocated approximately 10 minutes for participants to 
go through their messages in the DECIDE® platform. Within those messages were sector-specific injects as well as messages from other participants (if they had sent any) requesting or supplying 
information. Phase 2, “Discuss,” lasted approximately 15 minutes. In this phase, participants 
discussed the injects with the other members of their breakout groups. Lastly, Phase 3, “Integrate,” 
lasted approximately 45 minutes and brought all of the breakout groups back into an open forum 
in which they shared their internal discussions and determined how they would respond to the 
information provided.
 
Figure 4: Turn Phases
During each phase, data collectors used the DECIDE® platform to record observations based on their assigned areas. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS
1. Examine the Impact of a Cyber Event on Army Force Projection
a. The Army relies on various interdependent critical infrastructures, the majority of which it does 
not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily reliant on external resources.
b. A sophisticated adversary can disrupt force deployment and cause units to miss the Required 
Delivery Date by: (1) targeting commercially owned critical infrastructure and local municipal 
sectors; or (2) using cyber capabilities that do not trigger an armed response but still achieve 
cascading effects that complicate a coordinated response.
c. Interactions and interdependencies between communications and information technology 
systems present new gray-zone attack vectors that can have debilitating impacts on Maritime 
Transportation System operations vital to force projection. 
d. The current multidomain environment becomes contested for deploying units as early as the 
fort, thereby presenting the potential for degraded freedom of maneuver when conducting 
home-station movement operations. Therefore, military deployment operations can no longer 
assume such favorable conditions and must plan and prepare for and be ready to mitigate such 
physical and cyber disruptions accordingly.
2. Exercise the Cities of Charleston and Savannah in Cyber Incident Response
a. There is no standard for cyber incident declaration. Cyber incident declaration was found to 
be insufficient in addressing activities that are rated as below catastrophic and are likely not as 
obvious, yet are still operationally impactful for all parties.
b. There is an emerging need for city-level information security departments to address potential 
cross-system issues between organic and isolated networks, such as supervisory control and 
data acquisition and traffic management systems.
c. Participants across sectors and levels of government noted that the realistic scenario incidents 
stressed the participants’ procedures and forced them to think differently.
d. Participants across sectors and different levels of government should use municipality-focused 
cyber exercises to improve overall incident response.
e. Municipality-focused cyber and emergency management exercises can be effectively executed 
in a distributed format that supports continuous participant engagement across both public and 
private sector stakeholders.
3. Reinforce a Whole-of-Community Approach
a. Although traditional incident responses—such as for natural disasters or chemical or biological 
threats—are generally effective and coordinated, there is a need for improving responses to 
purposeful cyberattacks.
b. JV 3.0 addressed the need of many participating agencies affiliated with the cities for fully 
formed response plans and communication networks.
c. JV 3.0 revealed the need for more regular and codified cross-sector communication and 
collaboration efforts during cyber incident response.
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d. JV 3.0 and the JV series continue to facilitate lasting relationships between a vast array of 
participating organizations, entities, and sectors.
e. JV 3.0 successfully brought together a wide array of public, private, military, and academic 
stakeholders during event planning, preparation, and execution for the first time. However, the 
consensus remains that these new relationships must be continually fostered, and additional 
stakeholders (those who did not participate in this iteration of JV) must be both identified and 
incorporated going forward through future, organically driven, JV-like efforts.
4. Examine the Coordination Process for Providing Cyber Protection Capabilities in Support of DSCA
a. Though Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR) has been codified in policy, it has 
not yet been exercised, and it is unclear how it would work during an incident.
b. DSCIR should provide a menu of options and their associated costs similar to DSCA’s menu of 
physical assets.
c. Whether DSCA or DSCIR is the appropriate mechanism for receiving support in the event of a 
cyber incident that is beyond the ability of local resources to handle, each municipality needs a 
clear chain of requests, which could include federal or military resources.
d. The mechanisms and request chain for the military to request support from their surrounding 
community (“reverse DSCIR”) need to be explored.
5. Support the Development of an Adaptable and Repeatable Framework
a. Every municipality is different, so it is difficult to develop a “one size fits all” framework.
b. The Law and Policy TTX is an integral part of the framework requirements due to the challenge 
of translating national-level laws and policies at the local level and differences in laws and 
policies across states and localities.
c. Municipalities do not have the dedicated staff to develop these events internally and will need 
low- to no-cost assistance to do so.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Municipalities should consider adopting new internal incident command structures that enable 
the formation of tailored whole-of-community efforts consisting of synchronized communication, 
information sharing, and resource allocation during cyber and emergency incident response.
2. Establish a mentorship program between municipalities that encourages information sharing and 
joint cybersecurity exercises. The partnership program provides a safe learning environment in 
which local organizations can further develop their working relationships.
3. Federal, state, and local leaders must recognize cybersecurity and cyber incident response as a key 
responsibility and allocate resources to personnel, training, and education shortfalls accordingly.
4. State cyber and emergency incident response entities, such as the SC Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity program within the SC Law Enforcement Division and the Georgia Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security Agency, should work to establish standing, mutually 
supportive cyber resource support agreements that utiltize the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact framework and Mission Ready Packages to build regionally focused cyber incident 
response and support plans for responding to a cascading cyber incident.5 
5. Federal and state entities should execute annual law and policy TTXs that extend to municipalities 
and private industry. These events provide a venue in which leaders and responders can identify 
gaps in authorities, rehearse resource requests, and identify potential thresholds. In particular, 
State and National Guard response authorities and mechanisms differ by state and locality, and 
these will continue to evolve as cyberspace is better understood. As such, the law and policy TTXs 
will be critical for understanding the roles and responsibilities associated with utilizing National 
Guard resources.
6. Federal and state agencies should design and establish a data repository for resources and data 
related to cyber incidents, tailored responses, impacts, and exercises to facilitate the sharing of 
policies, procedures, best practices, data, and emerging issues. The repository should be open for 
municipalities and private entities to deposit and utilize resources to increase the resilience of their 
associated critical infrastructure.
7. The Department of Homeland Security, in concert with the DoD, should examine and potentially 
expand the United States Coast Guard Cyber Command’s authorizations, resources, and mission set 
to include initial cyber incident response support for strategic ports and port cities.
8. Through the respective garrisons, U.S. Army Installation Management Command should work to 
develop, incorporate, resource, and exercise a tailored cyber incident response annex within its 
emergency incident response plans for force projection and deployment operations.
9. DoD planners must utilize integrated campaigning at multiple echelons (city, county, and state) to 
understand adversary actions against interorganizational partners and better inform campaign plan 
assumptions.
10. In conjunction with academic and government partners, the ACI should develop and implement 
automated tools that will allow novice planners to rapidly design and quickly execute JV-like events.
5  “Emergency Management Assistance Compact,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (website), n.d., 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACoverviewForNRF.pdf.
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ACRONYMS
Acronym Definition
3ID 3rd Infantry Division
ACI Army Cyber Institute
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command
ARNORTH U.S. Army North
BDE Brigade
CIRI Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute
CISA Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019
DCO Defense coordinating officer
DECIDE® Distributed Environment for Critical Infrastructure Decision-making Exercise
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DSCA Defense Support to Civil Authorities
DSCIR Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response
EM Emergency management
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD Fire department
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GA Georgia
GEMA GA Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency
ICS Industrial control system
IPM Initial planning meeting
IT Information technology




NUARI Norwich University Applied Research Institutes
PD Police department
SC South Carolina
SDDC Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SLED SC Law Enforcement Division
TRANS Transportation
TTX Tabletop exercise
USAG U.S. Army Garrison
Table 2: Acronyms
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cyber.army.mil
 @ArmyCyberInst    @ArmyCyberInstitute    armycyberinstitute     armycyberinstitute
For the full report as well as more information on JV, please visit the JV website at 
https://cyber.army.mil/Research/Jack-Voltaic/
